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et al.: Searches and Seizures

SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
N..

CONST. art. I, § 12:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the person
or thing to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and
particularlydescribing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
COURT OF APPEALS
People v. Banks1
(decided May 4, 1995)
This action was brought by leave of a justice of the Appellate
Division, Third Department, in order to appeal the denial of the
defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence seized by the
State Police. 2 The defendant claimed that his right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures had been violated under
5
4
both the United States 3 and New York State Constitutions.

1. 85 N.Y.2d 558, 650 N.E.2d 833, 626 N.Y.S.2d 986, cert. denied,
116 S. Ct. 187 (1995).
2. Id. at 561, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment states in pertinent
part: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated....

."

Id.

4. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. Article I, section 12 provides in pertinent
part that: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
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Defendant argued that he was involuntarily detained by State
Police after a driver's license and stolen vehicle radio check came
back negative. The subsequent search of the automobile that the
defendant had rented resulted in the discovery of a large amount
of cocaine. 6 More specifically, the defendant claimed that: (1) the
continued detention after the initial stop of the defendant's
vehicle was an illegal seizure; 7 and (2) the consent to the search
of the vehicle was acquired during this illegal seizure and, as
such, the evidence obtained was the fruit of this illegal
detention. 8 The New York Court of Appeals held that the
continued detention of the defendant was not justified 9 and
consequently, the evidence ultimately seized should have been
excluded. 10 Accordingly, the order of the appellate division was
reversed, and the court of appeals granted the defendant's motion
to suppress. 11
On September 14, 1991, State Trooper Cuprill was in a marked
patrol car parked on the median of the New York State Thruway
in the Town of Bethlehem, Albany County. 12 At about 1:00
p.m., Trooper Cuprill pursued and stopped a blue Chevrolet after
noticing that the driver of the car was not wearing his seat belt. 13
After pulling the car off the highway, the defendant sat up from a
reclining position in the front passenger seat and Cuprill observed
that he was also not wearing his seat belt. 14
At the direction of Trooper Cuprill, Jones, the driver, exited
the Chevrolet and presented his operator's license and vehicle

and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated. . . but upon probable cause. . . ." Id.
5. Id. at 561, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
6. Id. at 560-61, 650 N.E.2d at 834, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
7. Id. at 562, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
8. Id. at 562-63, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
9. Id. at 562, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
10. Id. at 563, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
11. Id. at 563, 650 N.E.2d at 836, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
12. Id. at 560, 650 N.E.2d at 834, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
13. Id. The driver of the car was the co-defendant Jones. Id.
14. Id.
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registration. 15 He also produced a rental agreement for the car
which showed that the defendant was the lessee. 16 After Cupril
informed him that he was stopped for a seat belt violation, Jones
was questioned concerning where he was from and where he was
going. 17 Jones responded that he was completing a one-day trip
from New York City, where he dropped his niece off at college,
and was headed back to Buffalo. 18 The Trooper then instructed
the defendant, Banks, to exit the vehicle and, pursuant to his
request to produce a form of identification, the defendant handed
Cuprill a valid New York State driver's license. 19 Cuprill, after
ordering the defendant back to the car, ran a license suspension

revocation check on the licenses presented by Jones and the
defendant, as well as a check on the status of the vehicle, all of
20
which came back negative.
Trooper Cuprill then started to write two tickets for the seat
belt violations. However, instead of issuing them immediately, he
decided that he "wanted to go through the vehicle" and requested
a backup officer for a possible vehicle search. 2 1 When the
backup officer arrived, Cuprill ordered Jones to return to the
patrol car and handed him the two tickets. 22 Cupril asked if the
car contained any drugs or weapons and Jones responded by
15. Id. "Jones produced a nonpicture New York operator's license." Id.
His true identity was not discovered until after his arrest. Id. at 560 n.*, 650
N.E.2d at 834 n.*, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 987 n.*.
16. Id. at 560, 650 N.E.2d at 834, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. At the suppression hearing, Trooper Cuprill testified that the
defendant appeared to be "very nervous and agitated, staring at the Trooper's
sidearm." Id. The defendant was also questioned about where he was from and
where he was going, and he responded that "they were en route from the New
York/New Jersey area, had spent a couple of days in New York City and were
returning to the Buffalo area." Id. at 561, 650 N.E.2d at 834, 626 N.Y.S.2d at
987 (emphasis added). The Trooper retained the operator's license of both
occupants and also retained the rental document. Id. at 560-61, 650 N.E.2d at
834, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
20. Id. at 561, 650 N.E.2d at 834, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
21. Id. The defendant and Jones waited in their car without being told the
reason for the delay. Id.
22. Id.
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stating that there was nothing in the car, but that the officers
could go ahead and look. 2 3 The subsequent search resulted in the
discovery of a bag containing a half of a kilogram of cocaine

24
under the driver's seat.

The defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine was denied by
the supreme court because it determined that Trooper Cuprill's
initial stop of the car was justified after he observed that the
driver violated the law by not wearing his seat belt. 25 The court
also determined that continued detention was justifiable in light of
the inconsistencies in the responses to the questions regarding the
origin, length and destination of their trip. 26 Finally, the validity
of Jones' consent was upheld based on the fact that Jones had
27
authority to give such consent and did so voluntarily.
First, the court of appeals, sua sponte, addressed the issue of
whether the defendant had standing to challenge the search and
seizure. 28 The United States Supreme Court, in Rakas v.
Illinois,29 defined the scope of the interest protected by the
Fourth Amendment as a legitimate expectation of privacy. 3 0 In
Rakas, the Court used the legitimate expectation of privacy
analysis as the initial inquiry in determining whether a defendant
has standing to object to a search or seizure. 3 1 The New York
Court of Appeals, in interpreting the New York State
Constitution, has held that "as a matter of State constitutional
law, a defendant seeking to challenge a search and
23. Id. Trooper Cuprill then asked Jones to sign a completed State Police
Consent to Search form, which he unwittingly did. Id.

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The court also stated that the nervousness of the defendant raised a
"reasonable suspicion of criminality ...justifying [the] continued detention."
Id.
27. Id. The appellate division affirmed with two justices dissenting. Id. See
People v. Banks, 202 A.D.2d 902, 609 N.Y.S.2d 420 (3d Dep't 1994).
28. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 561-62, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at

988.
29. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).

30. Id. at 143-44 n. 12. The Court described this expectation of privacy as
one society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Id.
31. Id. at 143.
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seizure... [is] required to demonstrate a personal legitimate
expectation of privacy in the searched premises."

32

Thus, the

proper inquiry into whether a person had a legitimate expectation
of privacy should consider such factors as whether the person
took precautions to maintain privacy, the manner in which he or
she used the premises and whether he or she had the right to
exclude other persons from the premises or the property
searched.

33

Based on the foregoing analysis, the court of appeals concluded
that the "[d]efendant, as the lessee of the automobile searched,
had a possessory interest in, dominion and control over and the
right to exclude others from the vehicle" 34 and "the defendant

clearly had a legitimate expectation of privacy with respect to the
interior of the vehicle and its contents sufficient to give him
standing to challenge the search and seizure." 35 Therefore, the

defendant did have standing to raise his claim against the
government.
The first claim made by the defendant was that the initial stop of
the vehicle was not proper and that the continued detention
constituted an illegal seizure and, thus, was not justified. 3 6 The

court, in determining whether or not the traffic stop was legal,
started its analysis by noting that "[a] traffic stop constitutes a
limited seizure of the person of each occupant." 3 7 In People v.

32. People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351, 357, 538 N.E.2d 76, 79, 540
N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (1989) (citing People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160, 429
N.E.2d 735, 445 N.Y.S.2d 57 (1981)). In Wesley, the court of appeals noted
that there have been many cases where a defendant's possession of the seized
property was evidenced through dominion and control, but his or her
expectation of privacy in the searched premises was not sufficiently legitimate
to "invoke the remedy of suppression reserved for those asserting a violation
of personal Fourth Amendment rights." Id. at 358, 538 N.E.2d at 80, 540
N.Y.S.2d at 761.
33. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 148-50.
34. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 561, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
35. Id. at 561-62, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
36. Id. at 562, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
37. Id.
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May, 3 8 the court determined that the defendant was effectively
"seized" when the police ordered the defendant to pull his car
over to the side of the road. The court further held that this type
of stop or seizure was only proper if the officers had a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. 3 9 Here, the Banks court held that

the initial traffic stop was in fact justified, stating that "Trooper
Cuprill's observations of Jones' seat belt violation justified the
40
initial stop of Jones and [the] defendant in the vehicle."
The court next addressed the claim that the continued detention
constituted an unjustified limited seizure of the person and
determined that such seizure was illegal. 4 1 The court referred to
United States v. Sharpe,4 2 where the United States Supreme

Court

articulated

a

dual

inquiry

for

determining

the

reasonableness of an investigatory stop. 4 3 Under this inquiry, the

evaluation of an investigatory stop looks to "whether the police
action was justified at its inception and whether the stop was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the initial interference. "44
38. 81 N.Y.2d 725, 727, 609 N.E.2d 113, 115, 593 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762
(1992).
39. Id. See People v. Harrison, 57 N.Y.2d 470, 476, 443 N.E.2d 447,
450, 457 N.Y.S.2d 199, 202 (1982). In Harrison, the court of appeals held
that where the police forcibly detain or constructively stop or exercise restraint
over an individual, there must be some articulable facts sufficient to establish
reasonable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal acts or posed some
danger to the officers. Id.
40. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 562, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229(c) (McKinney 1988) (mandating that the
driver of a vehicle and all other front seat passengers be restrained by a safety
belt).
41. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 567, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
42. 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (holding that police must pursue an investigation
in a diligent and reasonable manner likely to confirm or dispel suspicions
quickly).
43. Id. at 682.
44. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)) (emphasis added). In
Teny, the Court held that the scope of the search must be "strictly tied to and
justified by" the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible. Terry,
392 U.S. at 19. See also Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (plurality
opinion). In Royer, the Court held that the "reasonableness requirement of the
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In People v. Milaski,45 the court of appeals held that state
troopers had a reasonable suspicion to justify the stop of the
defendant's vehicle, but concluded that they had no justification
to warrant a continued detention once the defendant had
explained his conduct, produced his driver's license, and
46
identified the owner of the car, which was checked via radio.
"At this point, the inquiry justified by the initiating
circumstances had been exhausted, and no evidence of criminal
conduct on the defendant's part had been discovered." 4 7
In applying this test, the Banks court found that "once
[Trooper] Cuprill's license and stolen vehicle radio check came
back negative and he prepared the traffic tickets for seat belt
violations, the initial justification for seizing and detaining
defendant and Jones was exhausted." 48 The court determined that
the trooper forced the defendant and Jones to remain at the scene
by retaining their licenses while awaiting the arrival of the
requested backup officers in violation of their constitutional
rights. 49 It concluded that the actions of the defendant,
specifically his nervousness and the inconsistencies between his
answers to Trooper Cuprill's questions and those of Jones, did
not, "as a matter of law, provide a basis for reasonable suspicion
of criminality. "50
The court found the detention of the defendant to be illegal,
then proceeded to address the issue of whether the consent given
by the defendant was insufficient, which would require

Fourth Amendment requires no less when the police action is a seizure
permitted on less than probable cause because of legitimate law enforcement
interests. The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification." Id. at 500.
45. 62 N.Y.2d 147, 464 N.E.2d 472, 476 N.Y.S.2d 104 (1984).
46. Id. at 156, 464 N.E.2d at 476, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 109.
47. Id.
48. People v. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 562, 650 N.E.2d 833, 835, 626
N.Y.S.2d 986, 988, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995).
49. Id.
50. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 562, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
See People v. Milaski, 62 N.Y.2d 147, 155-56, 464 N.E.2d 472, 476, 476
N.Y.S.2d 104, 108 (1984).
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suppression of the seized evidence. 51 In Florida v. Royer,52 the
United States Supreme Court held that consent to search "given
only after ... [being] unlawfully confined, was ineffective to
justify the search" in the absence of probable cause. 53 In Royer,
the defendant was stopped in the Miami International Airport
because detectives believed that he fit the so-called "drug courier
profile."' 54 The detectives held the defendant for approximately
fifteen minutes while questioning him. 55 Towards the end of the
questioning, one detective asked the defendant if "he objected to
the detective opening the second suitcase." 56 Royer responded by
saying "[n]o, go ahead," and upon opening it, marihuana was
found. 57 The Court affirmed the decision of the District Court of
Appeals of Florida, 58 which held that:
Royer had been involuntarily confined within the small room
without probable cause; that the involuntary detention had
exceeded the limited restraint permitted by Terry v. Ohio at the
time his consent to the search was obtained; and that the consent
to search was therefore invalid because tainted by the unlawful
59
confinement.
Similarly, in People v. Hollman,60 consent to search the
defendant's bag was held to be invalid because "the defendant's
behavior.. . was certainly not so suspicious as to warrant the
further intrusion.. . [and] the defendant's consent was a product
of the improper police inquiry." 6 1 In People v. Gonzalez, 62 the
court stated that the proper inquiry to determine the voluntariness
51. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d at 562, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
52. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
53. Id. at 497.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Id. at 494-95.
Id. at 508.

59. Id. at 495 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) (footnote
omitted).
60. 79 N.Y.2d 181, 590 N.E.2d 204, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619 (1992).
61. Id. at 194, 590 N.E.2d at 211, 581 N.Y.S.2d at 626.
62. 39 N.Y.2d 122, 347 N.E.2d 575, 383 N.Y.S.2d 215 (1976).
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of consent was whether the consent was "voluntarily given or
[was] only a yielding to overbearing official pressure." 63
Accordingly, the Banks court determined that "[tihe consent to
search was obtained during or immediately after [an] extended
detention and without any intervening circumstances." 64 After
finding that Trooper Cuprill admitted to a delay in "issuing the
traffic tickets and returning the licenses and rental
agreement... for the specific purpose of effecting a search of
the automobile," 65 the court ordered the suppression of the
evidence. 66
Under both the New York State and United States
Constitutions, a person has standing to object to a search or
seizure if he can establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the premises searched or the item seized. 67 Additionally, under
both constitutions, the seizure of a person is proper if the stop is
68
justified and if it is related in scope to this justification.
Finally, under both constitutions, consent to search cannot be
69
obtained pursuant to an unlawful detention.

63. Id. at 128, 347 N.E.2d at 580, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 219. In Gonzalez, the
court also stated that "[c]onsent to search is voluntary when it is a true act of
the will, an unequivocal product of an essentially free and unconstrained
choice. Voluntariness is incompatible with official coercion, actual or implicit,
overt or subtle." Id.
64. People v. Banks, 85 N.Y.2d 558, 562, 650 N.E.2d 833, 835, 626
N.Y.S.2d 986, 988, cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 187 (1995).

65. Id. at 562-63, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
66. Id. at 563, 650 N.E.2d at 835, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 988.
67. See People v. Wesley, 73 N.Y.2d 351, 357, 538 N.E.2d 76, 79, 540
N.Y.S.2d 757, 760 (1989).
68. See People v. Milaski, 62 N.Y.2d 147, 156, 464 N.E.2d 472, 476,
476 N.Y.S.2d 104, 109 (1984).
69. Id.
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